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How Long Do We Have? The Applicability of the 
Suspension Doctrine for Louisiana Mineral Leases in 
Light of Ferrara v. Questar 
INTRODUCTION 
[T]his case will have some significant impact in favor of 
landowners whose land is burdened by an older lease to the 
extent they are not being included in the Haynesville 
development. . . . It is difficult to assess the impact on any 
other landowner because the facts of each landowner’s lease 
may be different. In general, this is one of the first cases to 
deal with the legal obligation to fully develop a lease applied 
to the Haynesville Shale. . . . [I]t is probably going to be 
significant.1 
Those comments were made by Randall Davidson, counsel 
representing the lessors of a mineral lease in DeSoto Parish, 
Louisiana. His clients, the Ferraras, sought the cancellation of a 
mineral lease over approximately 50 acres in the Haynesville Shale, 
one of the largest natural gas plays in North America.2 The 
Haynesville Shale, where development first occurred in the summer 
of 2007,3 has created an enormous economic spike in Louisiana:  
This is an extraordinary time for Louisiana, particularly in 
north Louisiana, where we are experiencing something akin 
to a modern day gold rush due to excitement about the 
Haynesville Shale discovery. To put the magnitude of this 
sale into perspective: This month’s lease sale surpassed by 
more than double the bonus collections for the previous 11 
months of FY 2007−08 combined, almost entirely because 
of activity in north Louisiana. . . .  [Twenty-five] of the 38 
leases awarded were from Caddo, Red River and Bienville 
parishes, totaling approximately $34 million in cash 
payments, and the average bonus per acre for these leases 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2013, by NOAH BAKER. 
 1. DeSoto Landowners Prevail in Suit Against Oil and Gas Company, 
GDM, INC. (June 29, 2010), http://gdmlandsurveying.wordpress.com/2010/06/29 
/desoto-landowners-previal-in-suit-against-oil-and-gas-company. 
 2. Haynesville Shale, GEOLOGY.COM, http://geology.com/articles/Haynes 
ville-shale.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2013); see U.S. Crude Oil and Natural Gas 
Proved Reserves, EIA.GOV, http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/crudeoil reserves/; see 
discussion of Ferrara v. Questar, infra Part II.2.  
 3. J. Matthew Conrad, Development Issues in the Major Shale Plays, in 
OVERVIEW OF MAJOR SHALE GAS PLAYS 24 (Rocky Mtn, Min. L. Fdn., 2010). 
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was over $13,400 per acre, while more typical prices in the 
past for north Louisiana have been around $400 per acre.4 
Litigation over the contracts generating this revenue has also run 
rampant, and the results reached by the courts interpreting these 
contracts have had, and will continue to have, widespread financial 
consequences.5 Although the market for leasing has slowed down 
substantially since the announcement in 2008,6 the amount of 
property available for oil and gas exploration remains significant.7 
For the Ferraras, the ultimate ruling could have serious 
implications: hundreds of thousands of dollars could change hands.8 
Unfortunately, the law governing the central issue in their case is 
unsettled.9 The Ferraras’ case centered around the “suspension 
doctrine” and whether the doctrine could be invoked to suspend the 
obligations of a mineral lessee during any period of litigation over 
the mineral lease instituted by the lessor.10 The suspension doctrine 
is premised upon the idea that if a mineral lessor alleges non-
performance of mineral lease obligations by the lessee, brings suit to 
cancel the lease, and a court rules that there was no breach by the 
lessee, the lessor is in violation of his duty to allow the lessee 
peaceful possession.11 The remedy, as stated by Judge Caraway, is 
to “delay the lessee’s obligation for continued performance.”12 
Whether the suspension doctrine is still applicable to mineral leases 
and whether the period of litigation can be “tacked on” to the term 
of the lease after the litigation is complete, in effect “suspending” 
the term of the lease during the pendency of litigation, are critical 
and central questions.13 
In the initial Ferrara v. Questar ruling, the Louisiana Second 
Circuit Court of Appeal held that the doctrine applied to mineral 
servitudes but not leases.14 The court nonetheless found in favor of 
                                                                                                             
 4. Id. (quoting the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Haynesville Shale, supra note 2. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. At a conservative estimate of $2,500 per acre, the Ferraras’ leased 
property of 47 acres would be initially valued at over $100,000 even before 
drilling operations commenced. 
 9. Compare Ferrara v. Questar Exploration & Prod Co., 70 So. 3d 974 (La. 
Ct. App. 2011), with Rougon v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 575 F. Supp. 95, 100 (M.D. 
La. 1983), and Baker v. Potter, 65 So. 2d 598, 601 (La. 1952). 
 10. See generally Ferrara, 70 So. 3d 974 (discussing the suspension 
doctrine). 
 11. Id. at 980. 
 12. Id. at 986 (Caraway, J., concurring). 
 13. See id. at 981. 
 14. Id.  
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the lessee, Questar, and against the Ferraras, holding that the lease 
was still valid for other reasons.15 On rehearing, the original Second 
Circuit panel was joined by two additional judges, including Judge 
Caraway, who wrote an opinion concurring in the denial of 
rehearing.16 In his opinion, Judge Caraway concluded that the 
Second Circuit misinterpreted well-established law in determining 
that the suspension doctrine did not apply to a mineral lease.17 
This Comment will interpret the suspension doctrine and 
analyze whether the Second Circuit’s original opinion, or Caraway’s 
concurring opinion denying rehearing, was correct. After reviewing 
the history of the suspension doctrine, both mineral leases and 
mineral servitudes, and Louisiana jurisprudence, this Comment 
concludes that the interpretation of the suspension doctrine espoused 
by Judge Caraway is supported by past Louisiana Supreme Court 
jurisprudence and therefore is correct. Further, the suspension 
doctrine is not only still in effect, but is almost exclusively to be 
used in situations litigating mineral leases and not servitudes. 
Because the suspension doctrine is a jurisprudentially-created, pre-
Mineral Code doctrine, and neither the Mineral Code nor the 
Louisiana Civil Code contain any article overruling the suspension 
doctrine, it is still applicable today. If a lessor does not prevail in a 
suit alleging the lessee’s non-performance of lease obligations, the 
lessor is in violation of his duty to maintain the lessee in peaceful 
possession of the property.18 The remedy, as stated by Judge 
Caraway, is to “delay the lessee’s obligation for continued 
performance.”19 
I. BACKGROUND 
Contrary to other jurisdictions, there can be no establishment of 
a separate mineral estate in Louisiana.20 Besides perfect ownership 
of land, the two most common methods of obtaining the right to 
explore for minerals are the mineral lease and the mineral servitude. 
                                                                                                             
 15. Id. at 985. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 987. 
 18. LA. MIN. CODE art. 119 (2000); Ferrara, 70 So. 3d at 986. 
 19. Ferrara, 70 So. 3d at 986. 
 20. Long-Bell Petroleum Co. v. Tritico, 43 So. 2d 782, 791 (La. 1949); Indigo 
Minerals, L.L.C. v. Pardee Minerals, L.L.C., 37 So. 3d 1122, 1127–28 (La. Ct. 
App. 2010), writ denied, 46 So. 3d 1274 (La. 2010)); Keith B. Hall, 2012 Survey 
on Oil & Gas: Louisiana, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 511, 512 (2012) (citing 
Hodges v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 121 So. 2d 831, 836 (La. 1959)). 
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A. The Mineral Lease 
A mineral lease is an instrument by which a landowner or 
servitude owner, the lessor, authorizes another, the lessee, to look 
for and produce oil and gas from the tract of land.21 The Louisiana 
mineral lease is essentially the same as mineral leases used in other 
jurisdictions.22 The Mineral Code clearly states that mineral rights 
are both alienable and heritable.23 The agreement has the effect of 
law upon the parties, similar to leases where mineral rights are not 
involved.24 The contract may have any terms so desired as long as 
they are not otherwise illegal, immoral, or in violation of public 
policy.25  
The Mineral Code provides that its provisions are only used as a 
supplement to the Louisiana Civil Code.26 If the Mineral Code does 
not cover a particular set of circumstances, the Civil Code is to be 
applied.27 The Civil Code articles supplement the Mineral Code 
when evaluating mineral law, but not vice versa.28 Therefore, the 
basic legal principles of leases in Louisiana are applicable to mineral 
leases whenever the Mineral Code is silent.29 This allows refining 
the framework of the Mineral Code’s laws on mineral leases with 
the applicable Civil Code articles on lease and contract.30 Although 
article 114 of the Mineral Code gives a functional definition of a 
mineral lease,31 the subsequent articles do not give the substantive 
rights of either the lessor or lessee granted by the lease. 
Before the adoption of the Mineral Code in 1974, Louisiana 
courts were repeatedly faced with the challenge of evaluating the 
substantive rights of mineral lessees.32 It was unclear whether the 
                                                                                                             
 21. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 114 (2000). 
 22. See Patrick H. Martin & J. Lanier Yeates, Louisiana and Texas Oil & Gas 
Law: An Overview of the Differences, 52 LA. L. REV. 769, 823 (1992) (noting that 
mineral leases in Texas are similar to those in Louisiana). 
 23. LA. MIN. CODE art. 18 (2000); see also Ford v. Williams, 179 So. 298, 301 
(La. 1938). 
 24. LA. MIN. CODE art. 113 cmt. (2000). 
 25. LA. MIN. CODE art. 3 (2000); see also Queensborough Land Co. v. 
Cazeaux, 67 So. 641, 643 (La. 1915); Steele v. Denning, 445 So. 2d 94, 97 (La. 
Ct. App. 1984); Acquisitions, Inc. v. Frontier Explorations, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1095, 
1098 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
 26. LA. MIN. CODE art. 2 (2000). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at cmt. 
 29. See Jack W. Thompson, Jr., Comment, The Nature of a Mineral Lease in 
Louisiana, 25 TUL. L. REV. 497 (1951). 
 30. Caskey v. Kelly Oil Co., 737 So. 2d 1257, 1262 (La. 1999). 
 31. LA. MIN. CODE art. 114 cmt. (2000). 
 32. John M. McCollam, A Primer for the Practice of Mineral Law Under the 
New Louisiana Mineral Code, 50 TUL. L. REV. 729, 784 (1976). 
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substantive nature of an oil and gas lease was a “real right,”33 or a 
“personal right.”34 Historically, this led to several seemingly 
contradictory court decisions.35 However, the 1974 enactment of the 
Mineral Code ultimately and definitively classified mineral leases as 
mineral rights, which are finally deemed to be real rights and 
incorporeal immovables.36  
Article 16 of the Mineral Code, in comparison to the Mineral 
Code articles governing mineral servitudes, expressly states that 
some mineral rights are not subject to prescription of nonuse.37 
Furthermore, Mineral Code article 115 indicates that the interest of a 
mineral lessee is not subject to the prescription of nonuse, but the 
lease cannot be maintained for a period of more than ten years 
without drilling operations or production.38 This article is essentially 
a codification of Reagan v. Murphy,39 and the Mineral Code 
specifically notes that, although the mineral lease is indeed an 
incorporeal, it is not subject to the prescription of nonuse.40 
A mineral servitude owner may grant a mineral lease, but not the 
reverse.41 The lessor has an obligation to “refrain from disturbing 
the lessee’s possession, and to perform the contract in good faith.”42 
The filing of a suit by the lessor against the lessee for cancellation of 
the lease, if unsuccessful, has been interpreted to be a “disturbance” 
of the lessee’s possession.43 This rule is likened to Civil Code article 
2475. There, the obligations of a seller are mirrored by the 
                                                                                                             
 33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 476 (2013) (noting that one may have various rights in 
things, including real rights); LA. CIV. CODE art. 476 cmt. b (“Real rights confer 
direct and immediate ownership over a thing. They are distinguished from 
personal (obligatory) rights that confer merely authority over the person of a 
certain debtor who has assumed the obligation to allow the enjoyment of a thing 
by his creditor.”).  
 34. LA. CIV. CODE art. 476 cmt. b. 
 35. Compare Succession of Simms, 195 So. 2d 114 (La. 1965), with Reagan 
v. Murphy, 105 So. 2d 210 (La. 1958), and Arnold v. Sun Oil Co., 48 So. 2d 369 
(La. 1950), and Gulf Ref. Co. v. Glassell, 171 So. 846 (La. 1936). 
 36. LA. MIN. CODE art. 16 (2000). 
 37. Id. (“Mineral rights are real rights and are subject either to the prescription 
of nonuse for ten years or to special rules of law governing the term of their 
existence.”). 
 38. LA. MIN. CODE art. 115(A) (2000).  
 39. LA. MIN. CODE art. 115 cmt. (citing Reagan, 105 So. 2d 210). 
 40. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 115(A); Reagan, 105 So. 2d 210. 
 41. LA. MIN. CODE art. 116 cmt. (2000) (noting that the lessor need not own 
the thing leased, his “warranty being limited to one of peaceful possession.”). 
 42. LA. MIN. CODE art. 119 (2000); LA. MIN. CODE art. 119 cmt. (reiterating 
that there is a requirement of good faith in all contracts formed in Louisiana). 
 43. See Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 400 F.2d 122,124 (5th Cir. 
1968); Rougon v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 575 F. Supp. 95, 100 (M.D. La. 1983) 
(citing Hanszen v. Cocke, 246 So. 2d 200, 203 (La. Ct. App. 1971)); Baker v. 
Potter, 65 So. 2d 598, 601 (La. 1952). 
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obligations of the lessor of a mineral lease in Mineral Code article 
119.44 
Likewise, the mineral lessee has obligations to the lessor. Listed 
in Mineral Code article 122, the lessee is bound to “perform the 
contract in good faith and to develop and operate the property leased 
as a reasonably prudent operator for the mutual benefit of himself 
and his lessor.”45 The article also provides that the lessee has no 
fiduciary obligation to the lessor.46 
If the lessee fails to perform or violates the lease, the lessor is 
entitled to appropriate relief.47 Generally, the lessor will seek 
dissolution of the lease.48 Following the pattern of mimicking the 
Civil Code, this rule is aligned with Civil Code articles 1876, 2013, 
and 2018.49 However, courts are quick to point out that cancellation 
of a lease is a harsh remedy that should be awarded sparingly.50 
B. The Mineral Servitude 
The mineral servitude is much like the mineral estate of 
common law jurisdictions and is granted by a landowner to another 
party.51 Unlike most common law mineral estates, the mineral 
servitude terminates if not used for a period of ten consecutive 
years.52 This termination is known as prescription53 of nonuse.54 
                                                                                                             
 44. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2475 (2013) (“The seller is bound to deliver the thing 
sold and to warrant to the buyer ownership and peaceful possession of, and the 
absence of hidden defects in, that thing. The seller also warrants that the thing sold 
is fit for its intended use.”); id. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2682 (2013). 
 45. LA. MIN. CODE art. 122 (2000). 
 46. Id. The several factors to be considered in determining whether the lessee 
has acted as a “prudent operator” are beyond the scope of this Comment. For a 
discussion on a prudent operator determination, see 5 PATRICK H. MARTIN & 
BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS AND MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW, ch. 8 (1969); see 
also LA. MIN. CODE art. 122 cmt.; Williams v. Humble Oil & Ref. Co., 290 F. 
Supp. 408 (E.D. La. 1968); Carter v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 36 So. 2d 26 (La. 1948); 
Caddo Oil & Mining Co. v. Producers’ Oil Co., 64 So. 684 (La. 1913). 
 47. LA. MIN. CODE art. 134 (2000). 
 48. LA. MIN. CODE art. 134 cmt. 
 49. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1876, 2013, 2018 (2013) (explaining that if the lessor 
violates the contract, the lessee is similarly entitled to damages); see also LA. MIN. 
CODE art. 134. 
 50. Ferrara v. Questar Exploration & Prod. Co., 70 So. 3d 974, 982 (La. Ct. 
App. 2011); Rivers v. Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 559 So. 2d 963, 968–69 (La. 
Ct. App. 1990); Taussig v. Goldking Properties Co., 495 So. 2d 1008, 1012 (La. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
 51. LA. MIN. CODE art. 24 (2000) (“[A] mineral servitude may be created only 
by a landowner who owns the right to explore for and produce minerals when the 
servitude is created.”). 
 52. LA. MIN. CODE art. 27 (2000). 
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This prescription, a system for terminable mineral interests, was one 
of the principal purposes of the analogy to other types of servitudes 
in Louisiana law.55 
A servitude, as listed in the Civil Code, “confers in favor of a 
person a specified use of an estate less than full enjoyment.”56 A 
servitude is an incorporeal.57 Article 533 of the Civil Code states that 
a servitude is either personal or predial.58 A personal servitude is “a 
charge on a thing for the benefit of a person.”59 A predial servitude “is 
a charge on a servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate. The 
two estates must have different owners.”60 The comments to Civil 
Code article 646 explain that predial servitudes are essentially due to 
the estate, and not the owner of the estate,61 which means that the 
servitude will stay with the estate, regardless of who the owner is. 
The mineral servitude, most similar to the predial servitude, was 
first seen in the case of Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s 
Heirs,62 and it is generally seen as the most unusual aspect of 
Louisiana mineral law when compared to the law of other states.63 
Essentially, the mineral servitude not only restricts anyone from 
“owning”64 fugacious minerals that have not been reduced to 
                                                                                                             
 
 53. In Louisiana, prescription is the equivalent of a “statute of limitations” as 
applied in other states. For a more detailed explanation and comparison to the 
common-law analog, see LA. PRAC. CIV. PRETRIAL § 6:12 (2012–2013 ed.). 
 54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3448 (2013) (“Prescription of nonuse is a mode of 
extinction of a real right other than ownership as a result of failure to exercise the 
right for a period of time.”); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 754 (2013) (“Prescription 
of nonuse begins to run for affirmative servitudes from the date of their last use, 
and for negative servitudes from the date of the occurrence of an event contrary to 
the servitude.”). 
 55. LA. MIN. CODE art. 27 cmt. Mineral Code article 27 is a partial direct 
restatement of several Civil Code articles pertinent to prescription of servitudes. 
Landowners have an interest in seeing servitudes developed, and this Mineral 
Code article restricts servitude owners from holding mineral rights to manipulate 
the market for more than ten years without drilling operations. See also Frost-
Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245 (La. 1920). 
 56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 534 cmt. b (2013). 
 57. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 461 (2013). 
 58. LA. CIV. CODE art. 533 (2013). 
 59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 534. 
 60. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 (2013). 
 61. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 cmt. (noting that predial servitudes are not 
attached to a person; instead, they are due to anyone who may become owner of 
the dominant estate); LA. CIV. CODE art. 650 (2013). 
 62. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207 (La. 1920). 
 63. McCollam, supra note 32, at 739. 
 64. LA. MIN. CODE art. 6 (2000) (“Ownership of land does not include 
ownership of oil, gas, and other minerals occurring naturally in liquid or gaseous 
form . . . .”). This concept is in stark contrast to the law of several other states 
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possession independently from the land in which they are found, but 
it also restricts other rights.65 Therefore, the landowner does not own 
any oil and gas that may be underlying his land.66 Instead, the 
landowner has the exclusive right to explore and develop his 
property, along with the right to reduce them to possession, and in 
turn, ownership.67 
A landowner may grant a mineral servitude to any other person 
with capacity.68 Mineral servitudes are frequently purchased as 
investments.69 Once the mineral servitude is established, the 
servitude owner has no obligation to exercise it, but if he does, he 
can only use as much of the land as is reasonably necessary to 
conduct operations.70 However, the servitude will expire, as 
previously mentioned, if the servitude is not used for a period of ten 
years.71 Prescription of nonuse begins on the date the servitude is 
created.72 Unfortunately, Louisiana jurisprudence is not consistent in 
determining the exact time the servitude is created.73 
A pertinent rule regarding the mineral servitude is found in 
Mineral Code article 59, which states that, “[i]f the owner of a 
mineral servitude is prevented from using it by an obstacle that he 
can neither prevent nor remove, the prescription of nonuse does not 
run as long as the obstacle remains.”74 The comments to article 59 
indicate, but do not explicitly state, that the filing of a suit by a 
landowner contesting title to mineral servitude likely would 
                                                                                                             
 
where the “mineral estate” entitles a landowner to direct ownership of minerals 
under his land without any attempt to extract them. 
 65. LA. MIN. CODE art. 22 (2000) (“The owner of a mineral servitude is under 
no obligation to exercise it. If he does, he is entitled to use only so much of the 
land as is reasonably necessary to conduct his operations. He is obligated, insofar 
as practicable, to restore the surface to its original condition at the earliest 
reasonable time.”). 
 66. LA. MIN. CODE art. 7 (2000). 
 67. Id.; LA. MIN. CODE art. 7 cmt. (noting that possession of produced oil and 
gas is generally accepted to occur at the wellhead). 
 68. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 22. cmt. (noting that questions of capacity are 
resolved by reference to the general law.) 
 69. McCollam, supra note 32, at 740. 
 70. LA. MIN. CODE art. 22. 
 71. LA. MIN. CODE art. 27 (2000). 
 72. LA. MIN. CODE art. 28 (2000). 
 73. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 28 cmt. Because there is a strict ten-year limitation 
involved with the extinction of servitudes, determining when a servitude is created 
may be critical in some circumstances. Although not directly pertinent to the 
Ferrara decision, this is an important area to monitor in Louisiana mineral law. 
 74. LA. MIN. CODE art. 59 (2000). 
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constitute an obstacle.75 However, some case law may lend itself to 
an opposite conclusion.76 In Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., the 
Louisiana Supreme Court was presented with a defendant who 
argued that prescription had not run on his mineral servitude 
because the plaintiff’s institution of the suit constituted an 
obstacle.77 The court held that, in the specific circumstances of the 
case, no obstacle was present, but the court did not explicitly rule it 
out as a possibility if the facts were different.78  
A common issue with interpreting Mineral Code article 59 is in 
determining what constitutes an obstacle. Most cases addressing this 
issue deal with stating what is not an obstacle, rather than what is.79 
This Mineral Code article is a reflection of former Civil Code article 
792 (now Civil Code article 755),80 but it has only been applied in 
rare instances.81  
C. Adoption of the Mineral Code 
The adoption of the Mineral Code in Louisiana was a watershed 
moment intended to clarify what had previously been muddy 
water.82 Prior to the Mineral Code’s adoption, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court held that “[h]aving declined to enact laws for the 
regulation of the oil industry, and, particularly, having declined to 
adopt a Mineral Code, the Legislature has placed the stamp of 
approval upon the system of interpretation of oil and gas contracts 
which this court has followed for so many years.”83 The Louisiana 
Supreme Court had been faced with several instances of lower 
courts inconsistently and incorrectly applying the law with mixed 
results. This problem was sought to be resolved with the Mineral 
Code’s enactment.   
                                                                                                             
 75. See LA. MIN. CODE art. 59 cmt. (noting that, in Perkins v. Long-Bell 
Petroleum, “the court gave strong indication that under proper circumstances an 
obstacle would be found to exist.”). 
 76. See Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 81 So. 2d 389, 394 (La. 1955). 
 77. Id. at 392. 
 78. Id. at 394. The court further noted that “the facts of this case do not justify 
such a holding.” The landowner “did not at any time deny the defendant free 
access to the land for exploration purposes.” Id. at 393. 
 79. See id. at 393. 
 80. LA. CIV. CODE art. 792 (1870) (current version at LA. CIV. CODE art. 755 
(2013)). 
 81. LA. MIN. CODE art. 59 cmt. (2000). 
 82. McCollam, supra note 32, at 732 (“With some significant exceptions, the 
Code is essentially a codification of prior case law. . . . It should also be 
recognized that some articles of the Code adopt entirely new principles of law, 
while other areas are not affected at all.”). 
 83. Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 196 So. 336, 343 (1940). 
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Clearly, the Mineral Code was an attempt to unify oil and gas 
law, as well as set forth a framework by which courts may directly 
apply law. However, the adoption of the Mineral Code is by no 
means a discarding of all jurisprudential precedent. Notably, the 
Mineral Code is silent on the suspension doctrine even though the 
doctrine was already fully developed at the time of the Code’s 
adoption. However, the Mineral Code does say that the obligation to 
provide peaceful possession still applies.84  
II. THE SUSPENSION DOCTRINE 
One of the first instances of the Louisiana Supreme Court 
applying what is now referred to as the suspension doctrine85 was in 
Baker v. Potter.86 On September 15, 1947, Baker granted Lawrence 
Potter a mineral lease over an area covering 95.48 acres for a period 
of five years.87 Potter was to make annual rental payments to Baker, 
due on September 15 of each year.88 In 1950, the payment was not 
received until September 18, and Baker refused to accept it.89 On 
October 17, 1950, Baker sued for cancellation of the lease.90 The 
initial ruling was in his favor, but on appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana reversed, holding that the payment had been reasonably 
timely and that there was no ground for cancellation of the lease.91 
The defendants, who prevailed in the Supreme Court decision, 
filed for rehearing.92 The defendants, in addition to having the 
plaintiff’s suit dismissed, sought to have the mineral lease extended 
for a period of two years after termination of the suit.93 The 
Supreme Court initially declined to rule on this issue, but upon 
rehearing, addressed it.94 The court explained that, when the initial 
                                                                                                             
 84. LA. MIN. CODE art. 119 (2000). 
 85. The Louisiana Supreme Court has never used the term “suspension 
doctrine” when deciding cases involving mineral rights. The phrase was not used 
until the district court’s ruling in the Ferrara decision, Ferrara v. Questar 
Exploration & Prod. Co., No. 69,590, 2010 WL 7877122 (La. Dist. Ct. June 25, 
2010), but as Judge Caraway pointed out in his concurrence, the doctrine is 
misnamed. Ferrara v. Questar Exploration & Prod. Co., 70 So. 3d 974, 986 (La. 
Ct. App. 2011) (Caraway, J., concurring). A more proper name likely would be the 
“doctrine of repudiation.” 
 86. Baker v. Potter, 65 So. 2d 598 (La. 1952). 
 87. Id. at 598. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 599. 
 90. Id. at 598, 601. 
 91. Id. at 600. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 601. 
 94. Id. 
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suit was filed on October 17, 1950, the lease had been in effect for 
three years, one month, and two days.95 Because the litigation put 
the lessee’s rights in dispute, the defendants were entitled to an 
extension on the lease by the same amount of time the litigation 
lasted.96 This holding reiterated the court’s ruling in the 1924 
decision, Fomby v. Columbia County Development Co., where the 
court explained that “[t]he period of . . . litigation should not be 
included in determining when the leases expire.”97 This rule would 
come to be known as the “suspension doctrine.” 
The suspension doctrine provides that the obligations and duties 
of the lessee are suspended when a mineral lessor contends that a 
lease has expired and litigation ensues.98 If the lessee prevails in the 
litigation, he is granted an extension of the mineral lease, usually 
equal to the amount of time the litigation was ongoing.99 
A. Application of the Suspension Doctrine in Louisiana  
In addition to the Baker decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court 
and appellate courts have consistently applied the suspension 
doctrine in disputes over mineral leases. 
The first application of the rule was by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in 1916, in the decision of Leonard v. Busch-Everett Co., 
where the rule was introduced as an equitable means of continuing 
an innocent lessee’s rights.100 The lessor sought cancellation of two 
mineral leases, and the lessee did not act during the period of 
litigation.101 The court awarded the lessee additional time to perform 
under the lease after the conclusion of the suit.102 Although the rule 
had not yet garnered a name, it would become a pattern in Louisiana 
Supreme Court decisions where the lessee of a mineral lease was not 
at fault. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court came to the same conclusion in 
1924 with the Fomby decision.103 In that case, the court found that 
the initiation of the suit “made it utterly impracticable for assignees 
                                                                                                             
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. (noting that the litigation had lasted nearly two years). 
 97. Fomby v. Columbia Cnty. Dev. Co., 99 So. 537, 542 (La. 1924). 
 98. Baker, 65 So. 2d at 285–86; see Williams v. James, 178 So. 384, 386 (La. 
1938); see also Knight v. Blackwell Oil & Gas Co., 1 So. 2d 89 (La. 1941). 
 99. Id.; see also O’Neal v. JLH Enters., Inc., 862 So. 2d 1021 (La. Ct. App. 
2003). 
 100. Leonard v. Busch-Everett Co., 72 So. 749, 751 (La. 1916). 
 101. Id. at 750. 
 102. Id. at 751. 
 103. Fomby v. Columbia Cnty. Dev. Co., 99 So. 537 (La. 1924). 
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of [a mineral lease] to exercise the rights granted by the leases.”104 
The court concluded that “the period of [the] litigation should not be 
included in determining when the leases expire.”105 
Significant time passed before Baker v. Potter, the next 
significant ruling from the Louisiana Supreme Court regarding the 
suspension doctrine.106 However, only two years after the Baker 
decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued a decision, Perkins v. 
Long-Bell Petroleum Co., which proved pivotal in the Ferrara 
litigation.107 Unlike Ferrara, Long-Bell involved a mineral servitude 
and not a mineral lease. In Perkins, the defendants cited the Baker, 
Leonard, and Fomby decisions, but the court distinguished these 
cases because they dealt with mineral leases rather than 
servitudes.108 In a lease, both the lessor and the lessee are interested 
in developing the property because both stand to make economic 
gains from exploration and production.109 However, in the situation 
of a servitude, the landowner has no incentive to develop the land, 
and he is therefore without right to demand performance.110 His only 
duty is “to permit the servitude owner to explore as long as the 
servitude remains in [existence]. The grant of the servitude . . . does 
not oblige the owner of the estate subject to it to do anything.”111 
This brought the court to utilize what was then Civil Code article 
792, which concerns obstacles and stopping prescription of nonuse 
from running.112 Clearly, this rule is inapplicable to a mineral lease 
because leases are not subject to prescription. The court has never, 
and would never, apply former article 792 to mineral servitudes. 
Because the landowner did not create an obstacle, the court held that 
the prescription had fully run, and the servitude had expired.113 
Since Long-Bell, the Louisiana Supreme Court has not 
addressed the issue of the suspension doctrine, but other courts have 
followed the rule, both before and after the adoption of the 
Louisiana Mineral Code. In both Pennington114 and Hanszen,115 
decided by the Federal Fifth Circuit and Louisiana First Circuit 
                                                                                                             
 104. Id. at 542. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Baker v. Potter, 65 So. 2d 598 (La. 1952). 
 107. Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum Co., 81 So. 2d 389 (La. 1955). 
 108. Id. at 392. 
 109. Id. at 393. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. LA. CIV. CODE art. 792 (1870) (current version at LA. CIV. CODE art. 755 
(2013)). 
 113. Id. at 394. 
 114. C.B. Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 400 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 
1968). 
 115. Hanszen v. Cocke, 246 So. 2d 200, 207 (La Ct. App. 1st 1971). 
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Court of Appeal respectively, the courts applied the reasoning of the 
Louisiana Supreme Court to mineral leases and held that the 
suspension doctrine applied. 
In two decisions after the enactment of the Mineral Code, the 
suspension doctrine and its underlying rationale did not change. In 
Rougon, decided in 1983, the court quoted the language used by the 
first circuit in Hanszen, explaining that “according to established 
Louisiana jurisprudence,” the lessee is to be granted an extension for 
the period when the lease was in jeopardy.116 Similarly, in Noel v. 
Amoco Production Co., the court found that the lessor was restricted 
from alleging insufficient production because of the pending 
lawsuit.117 The court held that “the lessee should not be punished for 
the breach of an obligation which is brought about by the lessor’s 
act of questioning the validity of the lease.”118 
The suspension doctrine cases, spanning a period of roughly 70 
years, all support the application of the suspension doctrine when a 
lessor fruitlessly attempts to have a mineral lease cancelled.119 
Although the rules are different when mineral servitudes are 
involved, mineral leases are clearly subject to the suspension 
doctrine if the circumstances are appropriate. 
B. The Ferrara Decision 
In 1999, Questar acquired lease rights to a tract of the Ferrara 
land in Desoto Parish.120 In 2000, Questar drilled a well on land 
unitized with the leased premises, though not on them.121 At the 
time of the district court’s ruling on the matter between the two 
parties, that well was still in production.122  
                                                                                                             
 116. Rougon v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 575 F. Supp. 95, 100 (M.D. La. 1983) 
(quoting Hanszen, 246 So. 2d at 203).  
 117. Noel v. Amoco Prod. Co., 826 F. Supp. 1000, 1015 (W.D. La. 1993). 
 118. Id. at 1014 (equating Noel to Lelong v. Richardson, 126 So. 2d 819, 829–
30 (La. Ct. App. 1961)). 
 119. See Baker 65 So. 2d 598; Ferrara v. Questar Exploration & Prod. Co., 70 
So. 3d 974 (La. Ct. App. 2011). 
 120. Ferrara, 70 So. 3d at 977. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. Outside of this well, there was no evidence of any development by 
Questar. The presence of the well may seem to indicate that Questar must have 
been aware of the Haynesville Shale’s presence, but it was later discovered at 
depths not explored by Questar, or anyone else for that matter. Several other wells 
were drilled in the area between 1998 and 2000, including a dry hole on the 
Ferrara property. Ferrara v. Questar Exploration & Prod. Co., No. 69,590, 2010 
WL 7877122 (La. Dist. Ct. June 25, 2010). 
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In March of 2008, Chesapeake Energy123 announced the 
discovery of the Haynesville Shale, an unprecedented, large natural 
gas formation spanning across northwest Louisiana and into east 
Texas.124 On August 18, 2008, the Louisiana Commissioner of 
Conservation issued a statement recognizing the shale formation and 
its potential economic capacity.125 Seven days later, the Ferraras 
sent a letter to Questar demanding release of the lease or, 
alternatively, that they explore and develop the deeper zones within 
the Haynesville Shale.126 Questar did not immediately act or 
respond to the request, and on October 10, 2008, the Ferraras filed 
suit for cancellation of the lease.127 
1. District Court Ruling 
At trial, evidence of Questar’s drilling activity between August 
and December of 2008 was admitted, showing that they had drilled 
70 wells in the Haynesville Shale formation, none of which were on 
the Ferrara property.128 Questar objected that the development 
evidence was inadmissible, claiming that the suspension doctrine 
made it irrelevant.129 Though all of the evidence involved Questar 
actions that occurred after filing of the suit, the trial court 
nevertheless admitted it.130 After hearing Questar’s argument for 
why the suspension doctrine should be applied, the district court 
explained that this case was distinct from the cited cases because “of 
the ‘unique characteristics of the Haynesville Shale’” and that the 
suspension doctrine was inapplicable because of “the existence of 
the highly productive, ‘world-class asset,’ namely the Haynesville 
shale.”131 
                                                                                                             
 123. Chesapeake Energy is the second largest producer of natural gas and one 
of the most active companies in drilling oil and gas wells in North America. 
Chesapeake claims to be the most active driller of new wells in the U.S. 
CHESAPEAKE ENERGY CORPORATION, http://www.chk.com/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2013). 
 124. Haynesville Shale – Haynesville Shale Formation, OILSHALEGAS.COM, 
http://oilshalegas.com/haynesvilleshale.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). 
 125. Ferrara, 70 So. 3d at 978 (noting that the commissioner also dispensed 
with the production test requirement for proposed units in the Haynesville Shale, 
which effectively allowed approval of Haynesville wells to be expedited 
dramatically). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Ferrara, 2010 WL 7877122 (La. Dist. Ct. June 25, 2010). 
 129. Ferrara, 70 So. 3d at 978–79. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Ferrara, 2010 WL 7877122. 
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2. First Hearing at the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of 
Appeal 
On Questar’s appeal, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of 
Appeal also declined to apply the suspension doctrine to the facts of 
the case.132 The Second Circuit explained that the suspension 
doctrine did not apply for several reasons.133 First, the court 
questioned whether the suspension doctrine had survived the 
enactment of the Mineral Code in 1974, but ultimately elected not to 
address the issue.134 Second, the court explained that, even if the 
suspension doctrine were in force, it is only to be applied to mineral 
servitudes and not mineral leases.135  
The court cited both former Civil Code article 792 and equity as 
the foundations of the suspension doctrine.136 Article 792, as 
discussed, has been reenacted as Civil Code article 755, which 
discusses obstacles as reasons to suspend prescription of nonuse 
against a servitude.137 Since the dispute in question was over a 
mineral lease, the “doctrine” could not be applied.138 Finally, the 
court declined to apply the suspension clause that had been written 
into the contract between the Ferraras and Questar.139 The court 
declined to apply this part of the contract to the litigation because it 
was only applicable in situations where the right or interest of the 
lessee is disputed, and the Ferraras never disputed Questar’s right to 
develop, only performance of its implied obligation of further 
exploration under Mineral Code article 122.140 
Despite rejecting Questar’s arguments that the suspension 
doctrine should apply, the Second Circuit nonetheless reversed the 
district court’s ruling, holding that there was insufficient evidence to 
prove that Questar had failed to sufficiently explore and develop the 
                                                                                                             
 132. Ferrara, 70 So. 3d at 981. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. LA. CIV. CODE art. 755 (2013); id. (citing Perkins v. Long-Bell Petroleum 
Co., 81 So. 2d 389, 394 (La. 1955), where a mineral servitude was in dispute, and 
Baker v. Potter, 65 So. 2d 598, 601 (La. 1952), where a mineral lease was in 
dispute, but the court dismisses Baker without discussion or reason). 
 138. Ferrara, 70 So. 3d at 981. 
 139. The clause read: “Should the right or interest of Lessee hereunder be 
disputed by Lessor, or any other person, the time covered by the pendency of such 
dispute shall not be counted against Lessee either as affecting the term of the lease 
or for any other purpose, and Lessee may suspend all payments without interest 
until there is a final adjudication or other determination of such dispute.” Id. 
 140. Id. 
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property.141 The court noted that “[c]ancellation is a harsh remedy 
that is rarely granted; the breach must be substantial to warrant 
dissolution.”142 The Ferraras had allowed only 46 days between 
their demand notice and the filing of the suit, which the court found 
to be unreasonable.143 In conclusion, the court held that “[t]he 
district court was plainly wrong to find that Questar never intended 
to develop the Ferraras’ deep rights.”144 In the Second Circuit’s 
opinion, the suspension doctrine was inapplicable, but Questar 
nevertheless was held to not be in violation of its implied obligations 
under the lease.145 
3. On Questar’s Application for Rehearing 
On application for rehearing, Judge Caraway, who was not on 
the original three-judge panel, wrote an opinion concurring in the 
denial of rehearing.146 Two of the other four judges joined his 
opinion.147 
Caraway argued that the suspension doctrine should apply.148 
Without holding back, Caraway stated that, in the original opinion, 
the “misnamed suspension ‘doctrine’ is cast aside by the majority as 
untethered equity without any analysis of the parties’ contractual 
obligations in this breach of lease action. The lessee is thus 
admonished for ‘its dilatory conduct after suit was filed.’”149 
Caraway explained that the suspension doctrine is not based on 
prescription, as stated by the Second Circuit in the original 
opinion.150 There is no servitude theory involved in the suspension 
doctrine.151 Instead, there are bilateral obligations between the lessor 
and lessee, and the institution of a suit clearly disturbs them.152 The 
Second Circuit’s opinion was a “mistaken discarding of established 
law.”153 
The lessor’s failed suit for lease cancellation amounts to a 
breach of its warranty of peaceful possession, and the lease must be 
                                                                                                             
 141. Id. at 985. The court noted that more than one of the cases cited by 
Questar were decisions that predate the Mineral Code’s effective date. Id. at 981. 
 142. Ferrara, 70 So. 3d at 982; see LA. MIN. CODE art. 137 cmt. (2000). 
 143. Ferrara, 70 So. 3d at 984–85. 
 144. Id. at 985. 
 145. Id. at 974. 
 146. See id. at 985–88 (Caraway, J., concurring). 
 147. Id. at 987–88. 
 148. Id. at 986. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 987. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 986. 
 153. Id. at 987. 
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suspended.154 Caraway cited this warranty theory in the 1937 
decision, Smith v. Kennon, which supported the argument that a 
formal repudiation, such as the filing of a suit, puts the obligations 
of continuous performance in jeopardy.155 Further, there was no 
evidence that Questar did not intend to explore and develop the 
leased property.156 Finally, addressing the conclusion of the district 
court that there might be some “Haynesville exception”157 to the 
measure of a reasonably prudent operator, Caraway concluded that 
no such exception existed.158  
III. PROPOSAL FOR REVISION 
A. The Questar Decision 
Louisiana jurisprudence, including multiple decisions from the 
Louisiana Supreme Court, indicate that Judge Caraway’s concurring 
opinion was the correct application of law and that the Second 
Circuit’s interpretation of the suspension doctrine was flawed.159 
Initially, the Second Circuit held that the suspension doctrine did 
not, in any situation, apply in instances where a mineral lease was in 
dispute, restricting any potential application of the doctrine to 
mineral servitudes.160 Even then, the Second Circuit questioned 
whether the doctrine had survived the drafting of the Mineral 
Code.161 However, other Louisiana courts have almost exclusively 
applied the suspension doctrine in cases involving mineral leases, 
and not servitudes. 
Cases decided both before and after the enactment of the 
Mineral Code follow the reasoning of the suspension doctrine. 
Although each decision citing the suspension doctrine subsequent to 
the adoption of the Mineral Code was rendered in federal court, 
those courts correctly applied the suspension doctrine.162 The facts 
in those cases were extremely similar to those in the Ferrara case,163 
                                                                                                             
 154. Id. at 986. 
 155. Id. (citing Smith v. Kennon, 175 So. 763 (1937)). 
 156. Id. at 985. 
 157. Id. at 987. The original Second Circuit panel noted an unpublished writ 
grant where the court “rejected the same district court’s finding that the 
Haynesville Shale’s ‘quality and composition render it different from ordinary 
minerals.’” Id. at 982 n.5. 
 158. Id. at 987. 
 159. See generally Baker v. Potter, 65 So. 2d 598, 601 (La. 1952). 
 160. Ferrara, 70 So. 3d at 981. 
 161. See generally Ferrara, id. at 974. 
 162. Noel v. Amoco Prod. Co., 826 F. Supp. 1000 (W.D. La. 1993); Rougon v. 
Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., 575 F. Supp. 95 (M.D. La. 1983). 
 163. Ferrara, 70 So. 3d 974. 
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and Caraway was accurate in his attempt to correct the Second 
Circuit’s interpretation of well-settled law. 
Mineral Code article 2 says that the Mineral Code is a 
supplement to the Civil Code, and in cases of conflict, the Mineral 
Code prevails.164 In areas where the Mineral Code provides no law, 
the Civil Code governs.165 In regard to the suspension doctrine, 
because neither the Mineral Code nor the Civil Code negate its 
validity, the doctrine must still be in effect. Indeed, the Mineral 
Code articulates the lessor’s obligation to allow the lessee peaceful 
possession,166 and the institution of a lawsuit is in clear violation of 
that obligation. Further, the Second Circuit cites the Civil Code as 
the foundation and root of the suspension doctrine in the Ferrara 
decision.167 Because the Mineral Code does not exclude the 
existence of the suspension doctrine, it is still valid.  
B. Comparison to Texas Mineral Law 
Louisiana courts that allow suspension of the lessee’s 
obligations during a period of litigation are consistent with the rules 
governing similar situations in other states. 
In Texas, for example, the equivalent of the suspension doctrine 
is well established and regularly applied. In Coastal Oil & Gas 
Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, the Texas Supreme Court was 
presented with a lessor seeking to dissolve a mineral lease granted to 
a lessee, Coastal Oil & Gas.168 Similar to Louisiana law, the court 
explained that a lessee has a continuous obligation to develop a 
mineral lease.169 However, the repudiation of a lease by a lessor 
relieves the lessee from any and all obligations to develop or 
conduct operations.170 The lessee’s obligations are not reinstated, if 
at all, until the validity of the lease is determined by the court.171 
Just as the suspension doctrine provides in Louisiana, the Texas 
Supreme Court has found it unreasonable to expect a lessee to 
develop a challenged lease. 
In a case similar to Coastal Oil & Gas, Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn 
Investments, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court reached the same 
                                                                                                             
 164. LA. MIN. CODE art. 2 (2000). 
 165. Id. 
 166. LA. MIN. CODE art. 119 (2000). 
 167. Ferrara, 70 So. 3d at 981. 
 168. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 5–6 (Tex. 
2008). 
 169. Id. at 19. 
 170. See id. at 20. 
 171. Id. 
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conclusion.172 The 2004 decision resolved a dispute involving a 
lessor who sought to cancel a mineral lease granted to the lessee.173 
The lease stated that it would remain in effect “as long as operations 
are being carried on.”174 Again, the Texas court concluded that the 
lessee would not be bound to continue operations during the course 
of litigation because the lessee cannot be held responsible when the 
lessor is challenging his rights.175 
In Texas, if the court determines that the lease has not 
terminated, and thus survives the lessor’s suit, the remedy is to allow 
the lessee “a reasonable time after termination of the litigation in 
which to perform conditions required to extend the lease.”176 
Essentially, this rule has the same effects in Texas as the suspension 
doctrine does in Louisiana. Where the suspension doctrine has 
allowed lessees a “reasonable time” or, in some cases, an exact 
amount of time to resume the obligations of the lease, the “doctrine 
of repudiation” in Texas almost always allows a “reasonable time” 
to fulfill the obligations of the lease after the conclusion of the 
litigation. 
C. A Louisiana Without the Suspension Doctrine 
If Louisiana courts adopted the opinion that the suspension 
doctrine is inapplicable to mineral leases, there would be several 
negative consequences. Primarily, mineral lessors would be able to 
coerce lessees into producing and operating at higher standards than 
necessary. One of the advantages of the suspension doctrine is that it 
forces the lessor to remain at a distance while the lessee is 
attempting to operate. If the lessor brings suit for cancellation and is 
unsuccessful, the lessor has spent time and money litigating, and the 
lessee still has the same amount of time to operate under the lease as 
he would have had there not been any litigation. If the suspension 
doctrine were not applicable, lessees may be pressured to acquiesce 
to any demand by the lessor, regardless of how unreasonable the 
demand may be, in order to avoid litigation.  
                                                                                                             
 172. Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 157 (Tex. 2004). 
 173. Id. at 147. 
 174. Id. at 148. 
 175. Id. at 156; see also Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Samson Res. Co., 80 F.3d 
976, 982 (5th Cir. 1996); Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C. v. Valence Operating 
Co., No. H-07-2565, 2008 WL 4240486 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2008); Kothmann v. 
Boley, 308 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1957). 
 176. NRG Exploration, Inc. v. Rauch, 671 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1984); see also Chesapeake Exploration, 2008 WL 4240486 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 
2008). 
114 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 2 
 
 
 
Without the suspension doctrine, any suit by the lessor, 
regardless of whether it was successful, would count against the 
lessee’s time remaining on the lease. Even if the lessor’s suit were 
held to be frivolous, the lessee would still have significantly less 
time to perform and utilize the lease. If the lessee wanted to drill for 
the full duration of the lease, he would have to do so during the 
pendency of any suit, jeopardizing any potential profits. Even worse, 
if the litigation lasted beyond the length of the lease, and there is no 
production at the time of the suit, the lessor could effectively force 
the lessee to abandon the lease or operate it during the litigation at 
his own peril. The suspension doctrine serves as a way to buffer this 
potential problem, and it is critical that courts continue to apply it 
where lessors dispute mineral leases. 
D. Proposed Revisions to the Louisiana Mineral Code  
The Louisiana Legislature should amend either Mineral Code 
article 119 or 122 to reflect the continued applicability of the 
suspension doctrine to mineral leases. Although case law indicates 
that the suspension doctrine is good law, clarification from the 
Legislature would eliminate any doubt as to its continued efficacy. 
If article 119 were to be amended, as this author urges it should, 
the Legislature must clarify that “disturbing the possession” of the 
lessee includes initiating an ultimately unsuccessful lawsuit that 
disputes the validity of the lease. If the Legislature were to amend 
article 122, it would be necessary to state that litigation over the 
leased property serves as a sufficient cloud over the title to suspend 
the implied obligation to conduct future exploration, both for 
accumulating time in which the lessee does not develop the property 
and producing evidence of the lessee’s operations outside of the 
leased property during the period of the litigation. The lessee 
obviously has the right to continue exploration and development, 
but he should not be bound to do so when his rights are disputed by 
the lessor. 
Another possible revision would be adding a duplicate of 
Mineral Code article 59 to the chapter on mineral leases. An 
example of the article would read: 
If within the primary term, the owner of a mineral lease is 
prevented from exercising its rights under the lease by an 
obstacle that he can neither prevent nor remove, the primary 
term does not run as long as the obstacle remains. 
Even if the Legislature declined to redress the articles in the 
Mineral Code, the Louisiana Mineral Law Institute could still provide 
much-needed clarification. As seen in the discussion of Mineral Code 
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articles 59 and 122, the comments to the Mineral Code articles are 
enormously illustrative. If the Institute inserts a comment to either of 
the articles proposed for revision, courts would have the necessary 
guidance and confidence to appropriately apply the suspension 
doctrine. Although the suspension doctrine is clearly established, the 
Second Circuit’s misinterpretation indicates the need for clarity. By 
simply inserting a comment to either article 119 or article 122, the 
requisite transparency to the law surrounding the suspension doctrine 
would be ensured. In any case, the filing of a suit by a mineral lessor 
seeking cancellation should be considered an obstacle. 
CONCLUSION 
The suspension doctrine is good law, and its applicability to 
mineral leases should not be at risk of possible equivocation by 
Louisiana courts. By revising these Mineral Code articles, the 
Louisiana Legislature would bolster the confidence of private drilling 
companies in developing leases in Louisiana. The Haynesville Shale 
continues to be an important resource for the state going forward, and 
clarifying the law concerning a lessee’s protection in a mineral lease 
is critical. Further, the Haynesville play has shown the potential of 
mineral development in several other emerging plays across the state. 
Regardless of the Haynesville development, Louisiana has a 
prodigious future in oil and gas development. The Legislature has an 
opportunity to bolster what courts have held to be good law. A 
revision to the Mineral Code would be in the best interest of all 
concerned, and the suspension doctrine should be explicitly listed as 
good law to avoid any possible lingering confusion or dispute.  
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